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Book Reviews
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING. Edited by John E. Coons.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1961. Pp. 248. $5.00.
In May 1961 the present Chairman of the FCC, Newton Minow, made a speech on
the quality of broadcast content wherein he described a famous day and night which
he spent before his television set. The Chairman, by means of a now celebrated simile,
likened what he saw to a "vast wasteland." The speech, and especially the simile,
aroused a debate whose clamor still continues. Whatever the merits of the position
taken by many in the broadcasting industry that the Chairman's indictment was too
harsh, all will agree that the speech has sparked some much needed reflection con-
cerning the health and welfare of radio and television in America.
Symptomatic of this recent and welcome tendency toward some rather intense
introspection on the part of leaders within the industry is the book which is the
subject of this review. This book is a complete record of a symposium on freedom and
responsibility in broadcasting that was held at the Northwestern University School
of Law on August 3 and 4, 1961. The book is edited by John E. Coons, Associate
Professor of Law at Northwestern, who served as Director of the symposium. The
book comprises the addresses of the principal speakers: Leroy Collins, Newton N.
Minow, Louis L. Jaffee, and Roscoe L. Barrow. The book also collects the thoughtful
remarks of the other knowledegable participants who were invited to join in the
colloquy with the principal speakers. These included distinguished newspaper men
such as Ralph McGill, seasoned FCC lawyers such as W. Theodore Pierson, and
veterans of the broadcasting industry such as Morris Novik.
The participants made clear that the problems presented by a desire to improve
the quality of broadcast content are by no means new ones. The battle is a venerable
one by this time and the positions of many of the adversaries have long crystallized.
There are those such as W. Theodore Pierson who rely on (I) Sec. 326 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (the anti-censorship provision) and (2) a strict con-
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struction of the first amendment for the view that there is simply no legal basis for
any governmental regulation of broadcast content. There is, on the other hand, the
antipodal view of the present Chairman of the Commission who asserts that FCC
regulation of programming has received judicial approval. Thus, renewals have been
denied by the Commission on the basis of past programming on two occasions. In
each case, the Commission has triumphed in the courts.'
As is so often the case, both sides claim too much. Regulation of program content
has never on its own terms received the specific imprimatur of a federal court. On the
other hand, no federal court has ever said, in haec verbis, that the latitude of the
broadcast licensee is precisely equivalent to the freedom of the newspaper editor.
Professor Louis M. Jaffee, the distinguished administrative law authority, has in his
usual salient fashion pointed out the practical consequences of the imprecise character
of the licensee's sway over broadcast content and the Commission's power to regulate
the same. Each side is content to make the assertion of power and each resists putting
its claims to the test for fear that a definitive solution will be worse than the am-
biguous status quo. Thus, Professor Jaffee says (p. 44) :
As a lawyer, I am no lover of it (government by the raised eyebrow). Yet it is
more or less just what TV has been living with for some years... Neither side
wishes to run the risk of clarification. Each derives from the situation some posi-
tive power; each must adjust itself to, must manipulate, the margin of doubt.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Commission has now, however, resorted to press a little beyond the "margin
of doubt" and to journey, instead, rather tremulously but nonetheless determinedly,
into the yet unexplored realm of programming regulation.2 The Chairmanha s told
the industry that in the future it will at least be expected to perform according to its
promises. Thus, the Chairman pointed out in his address at Northwestern (p. 31):
On July 13, 1961, we informed every broadcaster of a change in, the Commission's
renewal policy. In the past we granted renewals even though there had been a
substantial failure to live up to the programming representations.... This will
no longer be the case. We have put our licensees on notice that 'proposals v.
actual operation' is of vital concern to the Commission .....
The above-quoted regulatory measure is couched carefully in terms of subsequent
punishment in order to avoid the fatal and unconstitutional stigma of prior restraint.
Whether Chairman Minow's new regulatory measures are valid is a matter that un-
doubtedly will be brought to the courts.
Where exactly the new frontier of programming regulation will end is at this time
1 KFKB Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. F. R. C., 47 F 2d 670 (1931); Trinity Methodist Church
South v. F. R. C., 62 F 2d 850 (1932).
2 The Commission has, of course, from time to time set down programming guidelines.
There is, for instance, the "balanced presentation" or "fairness" doctrine requiring a licensee
to present all facets of a particular viewpoint. In terms of the "fairness" doctrine the broadcast
licensee occupies the status of Cardozo's hapless tortfeasor. He need not present a particular
issue but if he does he can withdraw his hand "with impunity" only if he presents all the facets
of that issue. The "fairness" doctrine is stated in precatory terms and has been enforced with
remarkable mildness. See Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doc-
trine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1961).
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by no means clear. One thing that these provocative pages make abundantly clear,
however, is that that frontier is now being opened with a determination and a vigor
that will make the FCC a greater source of creative controversy than perhaps at any
time in its history.
JEROME A. BARION*
THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS. The 1960 Rosenthal Lectures. Lord Radcliffe.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pp. xi, 99. $4.50.
Lord Radcliffe, the author of this slim volume, is one of England's most eminent
judges. The lectures are an inquiry into "what in the end the law stands for and what
are its final purposes" (p. 4). The future development of society depends on how
men observe the law and such observance will be possible only if men believe that
law embodies "an order of living that commands the best part of themselves" (p. 12).
The book is an attempt to find such an order.
A brief review can give only a hint of the eloquent riches contained in this book.
Its three main divisions discuss: law and religion in England; the doctrine of public
policy and the reluctance of English judges to use it extensively; and a plea for the
re-introduction of natural law into judicial thinking. This review will briefly sketch
each of these three topics with some closing comments.
Lord Radcliffe's threshold premise is that law cannot be self-sufficient for then it
will be just a technique. It must be "a part of history, a part of economics and
sociology, a part of ethics and a philosophy of life. It must still stand rooted in that
great tradition of humana civilitas from which have grown the institutions of the
Western liberal world" (p. 93) .1 In his first chapter, "Pillars of Society," he describes
how, in the medieval period when the common law was first developed, law was a
part of the divine order and to be judged by divine law. During this period, society
was still a unity, with divine law, natural law and positive law all closely related
elements of a single overall "harmony of the world" (p. 5). He notes the subsequent
fragmentation of society and the resulting decline of the doctrine that Christianity
is a part of the law of England, the triumph of liberalism and tolerance having left
no room for any preferred treatment in matters of religion. Lord Mansfield's un-
successful attempt to replace the declining legal significance of Christianity with a
body of equity derived from natural law is also set forth.
Having given something of the historical background, Lord Radcliffe then discusses
the English judges' failure to make wide use of the doctrine of public policy as a
0 Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
One is reminded of Judge Learned Hand's observation that "it is as important for a judge
called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing ac-
quaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer,
Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato,
Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the
subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the
questions before him." THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 81 (1953).
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means of applying moral principles to law. Here, he sets out perhaps the most
profound conception in the book-that law has concentrated too much on
... what the State or the public requires in its own interest and too little upon
what the public should guarantee to the individual for the protection of his
essential dignity... [which] affords the true basis for a doctrine of public interest
to be applied by the courts as a substantive part of the law (p. 57).2
Examples of how this proposed focus would operate in contractual relations are given
and the conclusion summarized as follows:
We must see ourselves, therefore, as committed for good to the principle that the
purpose of society and all its institutions is to nourish and enrich the growth of
each individual human spirit. This is the only permanent public policy for
countries such as ours: and there are no considerations of convenience, or
material welfare, or national prestige that can weigh heavily enough to counter-
balance it (p. 65).
In the third and final chapter, "Not in Feather Beds," Lord Radcliffe sets forth
what he considers to be the compass by which a free society's law may be guided.
Whereas America has its compass in the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
England, without a written constitution and with a doctrine of legislative supremacy,
has a more acute problem in finding an appropriate compass. Lord Radcliffe's propo-
sal is that such a guide may be found in the law of Nature or a law of God, which is
part of "the great tradition of humana civilitas" (p. 93). As he sees it, Western
civilization is committed to natural law and to three constituent doctrines thereof,
to wit:
[M]an is by nature a rational and social being.... [T]he growth of each in-
dividual towards responsibility and the freedom to choose the best that he can
discern is a purpose which must never be conditioned by or made subservient to
other purposes.... [T]here is at all times and in all ways an ideal fitness of
things which corresponds to these beliefs and... by ourselves and working with
others we are bound to do what we can to see that this fitness prevails in human
affairs (p. 95).
Lord Radcliffe's invocation of natural law is hardly unfamiliar to American ears.3
The three "commitments" quoted above are indeed fundamental to a free society,
in one form or another, and perhaps the secular theorist who refuses to ground them
on some other-worldly foundation may well be hard-pressed to justify them to the
absolute skeptic. But a natural law theory of jurisprudence contains assumptions and
implications which have been disputed among secular thinkers since philosophy first
began. For one thing, characterizing principles as "natural law" implies that they are
grounded on the external world; further, that this foundation endows them with a
verifiability and universality usually attributed solely to the conclusions of the
2This focus on the individual citizen's interest, rather than on the state's, is similar to
Edmond Cahn's "consumer perspective." CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 23
(1961).




physical sciences. Both of these propositions have been vigorously debated for
centuries.
4
Secondly, natural law is necessarily derived from some theory of human nature, and
the claimed universality of natural law in both space and time implies that human
nature is fixed and ascertainable; further, this claimed universality implies that the
particular theory of human nature is similarly of universal applicability. As to these
matters as well, there has been no lack of disagreement. 5
In short, how one reacts to the natural law theory of jurisprudence suggested by
Lord Radcliffe will depend on one's fundamental assumptions about man and the
world irt which we live. Nevertheless, Lord Radcliffe's eloquence and penetration
make these lectures valuable reading, whatever one's fundamental assumptions.
HERMAN SCHwARTZ*
A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS. Milton R. Konvitz. WITH A STUDY OF STATE LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION. Theodore Leskes. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1961. Pp. vii, 293. $6.00.
The book A Century of Civil Rights by Milton R. Konvitz, With A Study of State
Law Against Discrimination by Theodore Leskes is in reality two books. So well,
however, do they complement one another that save for the purposes of analysis and
review, this matter would hardly merit comment. The fact is, though, that Konvitz
has attempted the well nigh impossible task, if we can believe his title, of encom-
passing one hundred years of a tremendous socio-legal revolution into approximately
one hundred and seventy pages. In a volume as small as this, the author necessarily
writes with broad strokes. One gets a sense of too much compression, some omission.
Notwithstanding the foregoing observation, the book by Konvitz and Leskes has
much to recommend it. It shows a definite sense of expertise in the field of civil rights
on the part of its authors and a keen insight into the underlying issues which bottom
the problems of race in the United States today.
Beginning his portion of the work with an examination of the American slave
system, Konvitz speculates on the nature of this system as compared with other slave-
holding societies. One need not completely agree with his theories about American
slavery to be convinced that there was something singular added to that system which
apparently had not existed in any other, and that this peculiariy has had a definite
bearing upon relations between black and white in the United States over the last
hundred years. "The Negro question lies far deeper than the slavery question" (p. 9).
* Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
For a recent attempt at developing a concept of natural law which applies to both "the
laws that scientific method seeks, and the laws that underlie human law," see BUCHANAN,
supra note 3.
1 Many of the arguments for and against a natural law jurisprudence are debated in
HUTCHINS, et al., Two FACES OF FEDERALISM 15-16, 81-126 (Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions 1961).
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In addition to the usual slave-master relationship, American slavery, says the author,
was a racial arrangement in a bi-racial society. Notwithstanding the loss of the
rebellion, the white southerner sought to continue this arrangement through the
black codes and the suppression of the free interchange of any ideas to the contrary.
To this unyielding attitude reconstruction was the only answer.
Briefly, Konvitz discusses the Civil War Amendments and the rise, fall, and resur-
rection of civil rights legislation from its inception to the recent Acts of 1957 and
1960. This is a useful resume of these various acts. The point made is that present
civil rights legislation is inadequate.
The core of the work undoubtedly lies in the author's notions concerning lunch
counter "sit ins." He approaches this aspect of civil rights after having dealt with the
transition from the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson' to the no-
segregation edict of the Supreme Court in the "Segregation Cases." The transition
treatment seems a bit thin. Moreover, the author's premise that "separate but equal"
was not an absolute constitutional evil but an imperfect good just does not seem to
hit the mark. Moving on to the "sit-ins" the author grapples with the legal issues
posed by the fact circumstances of these actions. Paradoxically, Konvitz draws great
strength from the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 wherein the United States Supreme
Court struck down federal legislation designed to afford to citizens of color the very
principles which the sitters-in now claim. Konvitz's constitutional analysis of the
problem is demonstratively keen. The one adverse criticism that might be made is
that he tends to oversimplify what to most lawyers are exceedingly difficult and com-
plex legal matters.
It is in the final chapter of this book that Konvitz scintillates. Here, he dissects the
argument that racial equality must be left to voluntary conduct, exempt from legal
sanctions and shows it for what it is. Herein, he argues that the public policy in areas
inhabited by two-thirds of all Americans in 1954 was against racial segregation and
discrimination, and that southerners who say that law cannot change mores have
relied on the power of law to prevent change in mores.
Leskes portion of the work is a well done description of what the states have done
and are doing in the area of public accomodations and fair employment, educational,
and housing practices. It is well to have this material in the book. Federal activity
or lack of activity in the area of civil rights so predominates that there is a tendency
to overlook what the states can do and are doing. Leskes points out the effectiveness
of the administrative process as opposed to the judicial process in this area.
Undoubtedly the authors could defend the absences of certain materials, but when
a book which purports to run the gamut of civil rights makes no or only footnote
mention of "blood, sweat and tears" cases like Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
Registrar of the University of Missouri,2 Sweat v. Painter3 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents4 and only whispers over the questions of voting rights or personal
security, something is left to be desired.
' 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
2305 U. S. 337 (1938).
- 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
'339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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On balance Konvitz and Leskes have done an admirable job. In this reviewer's
opinion the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on civil rights.
DORSEY EDWARD LANE*
SHOULD UNCLE SAM PAY-WHEN AND WHY? SELECTED OPINIONS OF MARVIN
JONES. Privately Published.
Harrison Tweed reviewing William Prosser's The Judicial Humorist in the American
Bar Association Journal' wrote, "Humor is rarely at its best unless it is spontaneous.
Judges who try too hard forget the need of brevity and overstrain their power to
compel attention." Marvin Jones, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Claims,
is one of those rare judges whose humor is spontaneous. He does not have to "try too
hard." Perhaps it is his Texas background. Maybe it is his many years of politicking
and speech-making. 2 Whatever the reason, Judge Jones is gifted in having judicial
humor.
At the request of friends and colleagues, Judge Jones compiled some of his choice
opinions that have human interest in his Should Uncle Sam Pay-When and Why?
It was the judge's desire that the opinions would have appeal to lawyers and laymen
alike and that they would be representative of the type of controversy over which
the United States Court of Claims has jurisdiction and the problems with which that
court is confronted. The result is the compiling of twenty-eight cases from the Court
of Claims Reports. Both the caption given to each case and the case itself represent
the judge's wit.
For human interest I was particularly struck by "The Ubiquitous Jeep, What Is It?"
That case is found in the reports under Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The
United States.3 "The jeep, having been everywhere else, is now in court" is the open-
ing statement of the opinion. That was the case wherein Judge Jones, delivering the
opinion of the court, decided that the wartime jeep was a passenger vehicle, not a
freight vehicle, and thus subject to a certain rate. Even though the jeep "did much
hauling," it was primarily a passenger vehicle. Judge Jones wrote, "I have seen my
father haul everything from ploughshares to a crosscut saw in a buggy, but that hardly
made the buggy a freight vehicle" (p. 11).
For humor there is nothing better in the book than "Two Dogs, A Cat and Govern-
ment Red Tape." 4 What was the Court of Claims to do with a woman who refused
to travel without her two dogs and a cat? The State Department refused to allow the
Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law.
139 A.B.A.J. 313 (1953).
Chief Judge Jones is one of the few men who have held important positions in all three
branches of the federal government. He was a member of Congress for twenty-four years
representing the Eighteenth District in Texas. During World War II he served as assistant to
James F. Byrnes, who was Director of Economic Stabilization. He was appointed United States
Food Administrator and Chairman of the Allied Food Board during World War II.
117 C. Cl. 534 (1950).
'C. C. M. Pedersen v. The United States, 115 C. Cl. 335 (1950).
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plaintiff per diem expenses because he and his wife were delayed in Egypt en route
from Turkey to the United States during the spring of 1945. The government con-
tended that the cause of the delay was the plaintiff's refusal to travel without her pets.
There are some amusing passages about dogs. But, even though "the dog has been
able to awaken affection in the hearts of every race of people," (p. 7) Mrs. Pedersen's
refusal to leave without her animals and charging the delay in time of national peril
was not justified.
One wonders why a commercial publishing company does not acquire the rights
to republish Judge Jones' book. It deserves a wider circulation.
JOHN R. VALERI*
* Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, The Catholic University of America School
of Law.
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